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Immigrants’ Rights in the Courts and Congress: 
Constitutional Protections and the Rule of Law 
After 9/11† 
Lucas Guttentag∗ 
We are facing difficult challenges and significant opportunities as 
Congress grapples with immigration legislation and the courts 
address immigrants’ rights. We all witnessed the astonishing 
demonstrations across the country in the spring of 2006. We watched 
with surprise as legislation recently was passed by the U.S. Senate to 
address a dysfunctional immigration system. The so-called 
comprehensive immigration reform bill held out the promise of legal 
status to millions of undocumented immigrants and suggested it 
would do something for the additional millions who are stuck in an 
immigration backlog despite being eligible for legal status. That was 
the hope, but it also camouflaged grave deficiencies. My goal is to 
draw attention to some of those shortcomings, to put them into the 
context of 9/11 and recent legislation as well as our historic attitudes, 
and to focus on the essential need to preserve and restore effective 
judicial review as a cornerstone of immigrants’ rights.  
The current legislation arises in a time fear and even hostility 
toward immigration and immigrants. First and foremost, the 
aftermath of 9/11 permeates every debate over immigration and every 
discussion of proposed reform. The continuing perception that the 
border is out of control, the agitation of the so-called minutemen in 
towns and cities across the country, and the enactment of local 
 
 † This speech was originally delivered in October 2006 at Washington University in St. 
Louis School of Law as part of the 2006–2007 Public Interest Speakers Series. It has been 
revised and edited for publication. 
  ∗ Lucas Guttentag is the national director of the Immigrants’ Rights Project of the 
American Civil Liberties Union and teaches courses on the constitutional and civil rights of 
immigrants at U.C. Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law and Stanford Law School.  
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ordinances targeting immigrants (including here in Missouri where a 
Valley Park ordinance is currently subject to legal challenge as an 
unconstitutional regulation of immigration) all play a significant role. 
We could talk about each of these topics at great length and each 
deserves substantial discussion. My comments will necessarily be 
limited and general.  
Let me first say something about 9/11 because that was a 
watershed event. In some respects, it fundamentally altered the way 
the country is thinking about immigration. At the same time, it 
exposed problems in the immigration system that have long been 
festering but generally receive little attention, such as individuals 
being administratively detained for lengthy periods of time, being 
transferred to remote jails far from families and communities, being 
unable to access lawyers, and being subjected to inhumane detention 
conditions. Some of those practices drew sustained public scrutiny 
for the first time in the aftermath of 9/11. The policies of the 
Administration after the terrorist attacks focused the public and press 
on the vulnerability of immigrants and bared the government’s power 
in ways that are not evident when the immigration authority lays 
dormant.  
The impact of 9/11 was not just in terms of affecting the general 
view of immigration. The terrorist attacks also triggered very specific 
policies and practices that threatened the core constitutional rights of 
immigrants. Let me identify a few of the practices and address where 
I think they fit into the larger picture. First, many non-citizens were 
detained in the aftermath of 9/11. Second, and relatedly, there was 
overt discrimination against people from Arab countries and Muslims 
through targeted interrogations, arrest and detention practices and 
policies, and through the so-called “special registration” program 
applicable to non-immigrants from only certain countries. That 
program seemed more like a trap than an investigative tool. It erected 
new and complex technical requirements without adequate notice or 
explanation in a way that created grounds of deportation for those 
who misunderstood or failed to comply. Third, the Administration 
implemented so-called “closed”—or secret—deportation hearings 
that had the effect of preventing the public from knowing where an 
immigrant was, what he was charged with, how he was being 
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detained and when his hearing might be scheduled. No public docket 
was posted. There was no practical way to know when or where a 
person who had been arrested a day, a week, or a month ago would 
get a hearing before an immigration judge. We challenged those 
closed hearings on First Amendment grounds, and the federal courts 
ultimately divided on whether they were constitutional. In the face of 
Administration representations that the hearings were no longer being 
conducted, the Supreme Court declined to hear the issue.  
Today, the larger debate transcends the immediate post-9/11 
policies. Comprehensive immigration legislation asks us to consider 
the role of immigrants in society more broadly. At bottom, I believe 
that the contemporary debate is not fundamentally different than the 
ambivalence with which we have always confronted immigration 
policy in this country.  
In my view, there are always two strands in America’s response to 
immigration and immigrants; there are two instincts in us as 
Americans. On the one hand, we truly are a nation of immigrants. We 
celebrate that rightfully. We are the most generous country in the 
world in terms of welcoming newcomers and granting them legal 
status and citizenship. The Statue of Liberty is the icon that we all 
hold up as the ideal. This is a fundamental part of what we are as a 
country and in many ways it sets us apart from other countries in the 
world. It is always a part of what informs our policy and our instincts.  
The other strand is not so pretty, but it too is always present. We 
are fearful of immigrants. We are xenophobic. We have a history of 
racism. We have excluded people based on their political beliefs, 
based on their sexual orientation, based on their country of origin, 
and based on their race. Throughout our history, we have feared new 
waves of immigrants from different places, of different colors, and 
with different backgrounds than those who have come before.  
Sometimes, one strand predominates and sometimes the other. But 
both are always present, whether at the forefront or just beneath the 
surface. Whichever is predominating, the other is there as well. When 
we are less confident, whether due to concerns over national security, 
economic uncertainty, or change more generally, the risk is much 
greater that we will blame immigration as the source of our problems.  
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At other times, when our values of equality and liberty are 
ascendant, they are more likely to be reflected in our immigration 
policy as well. For example, during the civil rights period of the 
1960s, the last great era of federal civil rights legislation, we repealed 
the notorious and overtly racist National Origins Act enacted in the 
1920s. Those quota laws were expressly designed to preserve an 
earlier America by trying to roll back the racial and ethnic 
composition of our country to what it had been in the 1880s. During 
the decades of the quota laws, the acknowledged goal of U.S. 
immigration policy was to try to maintain a population dominated by 
descendents of a white northern Europeans by admitting immigrants 
from western European countries while severely restricting or 
entirely prohibiting new immigration from Asia and eastern or 
southern Europe. Repealing those quota laws was a manifestation of 
our confidence and a sign of progress.  
Today we are again in a period too easily dominated by fear and 
insecurity. We fear the dangers of terrorism, the loss of job 
opportunities, wage stagnation, and global competition. All those 
dynamics are feeding into the immigration debate.  
The challenge, I believe, is to recognize that immigration has 
never been static. Too often we look backwards to celebrate the 
immigration that occurred long ago, while fearing the immigration 
that is occurring today. We see immigration as an historical artifact 
rather than as an ongoing dynamic process. At every point in our 
history, the immigration of the moment has been perceived as being 
different than the immigration of an earlier generation. And in some 
sense, that is of course true. Immigration is never exactly as it was 
before. It is a continually evolving process. And it is also true that 
immigration changes America. It has always done that, and it will 
continue to change us as a country.  
But, in my view, that is not something to be afraid of; that is 
something to celebrate. I am glad that we are not the same country 
that we were forty, fifty, or one-hundred years ago; that my parents 
could immigrate to the United States, and that many others who have 
come since are part of the fabric of our nation. I think we should 
continue to welcome the change that immigration brings, not fear it. 
We should appreciate that while immigrants change us, the more 
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profound and fundamental change is to those who come. They are 
different because they become Americans. And that evolution in 
ourselves and in the immigrants who come sets us apart from the rest 
of the world, has made us a great country and will continue to do so. 
The fear of immigration needs to be abandoned and rebutted.  
As immigration reform proposals percolate, we also need to 
consider the consequences of the most recent piece of major 
immigration legislation, namely the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, or IIRIRA. For those of us 
who grapple with immigrants’ rights or who represent individual 
immigrants before the immigration service or in the federal courts, 
the consequences of IIRIRA have in many respects proven to be far 
more profound and lasting than the effects of 9/11. The hallmark of 
the 9/11 policies—which I tend to encapsulate as the practices of 
detention, discrimination and secrecy—is that virtually all were 
adopted not by statute or law, but by regulation, executive order and 
administrative rule. In other words, although the U.S.A. Patriot Act 
contained nefarious immigration provisions, it had little immediate 
impact on immigration policy and enforcement. Rather, the Bush 
Administration’s post-9/11 policies were largely based on the orders 
and decisions of the Executive Branch. That in itself, of course, 
reveals the extraordinary power of the Executive over immigration 
and the need for rigorous checks and scrutiny. But it also underscores 
that many of the most lasting challenges to immigrants’ rights today 
are still the consequence of the 1996 IIRIRA rather than of the 
specific policies adopted post 9/11. 
Like many other immigration statutes, IIRIRA got virtually no 
attention when it was proposed or enacted. Immigration law is super 
technical. Immigration policy engenders all sorts of odd political 
alliances. As already noted, it gets wrapped up in law enforcement 
concerns and other kinds of security considerations. For all those 
reasons, it is very difficult to debate immigration policy in a calm, 
rational, and policy-driven way. 
The 1996 law, signed by President Clinton, contained a series of 
devastating provisions that imposed massive new detention measures; 
enacted something called “expedited removal,” which provides that 
that someone who is arriving at the borders of the United States can 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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be summarily expelled without any hearing, without any adversarial 
process, without any opportunity to present his or her claim unless 
the border inspector determines that the individual might be a 
refugee; authorized applications of expedited removal to some 
immigrants and interior areas of the United States; and dramatically 
expanded the categories of crimes included in the then-recent 
category of crimes known as “aggravated felonies.” That last 
provision warrants a brief explanation. The term aggravated felony 
conjures up images of horrible crimes. But in fact, it has come to 
encompass minor offenses—misdemeanors, non-violent crimes, and 
others—that far exceed any commonsense definition. And the 
government has so aggressively and expansively interpreted the term 
that it has spawned immense court of appeals litigation and even 
several Supreme Court decisions that have rejected the government’s 
position. 
The lasting impact of IIRIRA is also the result of its elimination 
of significant areas of discretion that have historically been a part of 
the immigration system and that have traditionally ameliorated some 
of the law’s harshest effects. In a very simplistic way, the 
immigration laws often work by sweeping incredibly broadly to make 
large numbers of non-citizens potentially vulnerable to deportation or 
removal or exclusion based on relatively expansive and vague 
grounds. In fact, many of the grounds would be constitutionally 
suspect if applied to a U.S. citizen in the criminal or even civil 
regulatory context. These include, for example, economic status, 
predictions of future behavior, engaging in certain immoral acts, 
suffering from a dangerous or contagious medical condition, political 
beliefs and affiliations, and so on. The fact that they are deemed 
acceptable in the immigration setting is based on the notion that 
different interests are at stake and on the deeply entrenched view that 
constitutional deference is owed to immigration policy choices. 
Removal laws may impose severe penalties even on people who may 
have lived here for many years, who are legal residents, and whose 
children and spouses may be United States citizens. But—and 
perhaps in recognition of the severity—the law has also traditionally 
provided a significant measure of discretion to allow immigration 
judges to consider the specific facts and equities of individual 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/3
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circumstances in deciding whether to enforce deportation in a 
particular case or to exercise discretion favorably. The breadth of that 
discretion has raised its own issues of fairness and consistency, and 
the federal courts were a crucial component in providing some 
measure of oversight.  
The 1996 law largely eviscerated that framework in several 
important respects. First, IIRIRA restricted or eliminated eligibility 
for discretion in many cases. Then it set the standards so high as to 
make the waivers almost unattainable in practice. Finally, IIRIRA 
largely prohibited the courts from reviewing a decision for abuse of 
discretion, thereby eliminating a crucial external check. The effect of 
harsher laws, restrictions on waivers and unreviewable agency 
discretion has fundamentally altered the functioning of the system 
and caused untold hardship and pain. 
But IIRIRA’s most profound and enduring threat, in my judgment, 
is the statute’s attempt to enact sweeping restrictions on federal court 
jurisdiction over whole categories of deportation orders. These are 
the so-called “court-stripping” provisions that sought to eliminate the 
historic role of the federal courts to decide claims by immigrants that 
the government is violating the law or even the Constitution. Court-
stripping is the term to describe a measure that strips the federal 
courts of jurisdiction to review certain acts or decisions of the 
government. Court-stripping seeks to deny the Judiciary the power to 
enforce the rule of law and the Constitution by erecting jurisdictional 
barriers. I call it a kind of “backdoor” amendment to the Constitution 
because prohibiting the courts from enforcing the Constitution is an 
indirect way of eliminating the constitutional protection itself.  
That device is not new. The modern history of court-stripping 
arose, so far as I know, in the aftermath of the Brown v. Board of 
Education1 decision when the federal courts first required that the 
schools of the South desegregate and subsequently began issuing 
orders that busing be used as a means to accomplish that integration. 
Senators opposed to integration but knowing they could not change 
the Constitution tried to restrict the federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear 
 
 1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 482 (1954). 
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school desegregation cases or to issue busing orders to desegregate 
the schools. Similar proposals arose again after the abortion decision 
to deny the federal courts’ power to enforce a woman’s right of 
choice under Roe v. Wade.2 And it came up after the Supreme Court 
held that prayer in schools was impermissible.3 In each of those 
instances, those who opposed a substantive right sought to undermine 
or eliminate the ability of individuals to enforce their right by taking 
away the federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear categories of cases or 
issue specified types of remedial orders. Those court-stripping 
proposals were defeated because they were recognized for what they 
were—a way of keeping the schools segregated, denying women the 
right to choose, and restoring prayer in public schools in violation of 
the Constitution. 
But in 1996, court-stripping measures actually were enacted. Who 
were the targets? Immigrants and prisoners. For immigrants, the law 
tried to deny the right of judicial review over certain deportation 
orders; for prisoners the restrictions sought to limit injunctive relief 
for inhumane prison conditions that courts across the country had 
been enjoining for decades.  
And so the question arose whether the Constitution permits 
depriving immigrants of judicial review of deportation decisions. 
May Congress take away the right of immigrants to go to court to 
obtain a judicial determination from an Article III court of the 
Executive Branch’s removal order? At the time of IIRIRA, most did 
not recognize the profound significance and danger of these 
enactments. The peril to judicial review, to separation of powers and 
to checks and balances was not widely appreciated. But we designed 
and launched a national legal and advocacy strategy to challenge the 
new restrictions. For five years, my colleagues and I with the support 
of key scholars and some prominent commentators brought legal 
challenges to the 1996 laws in courts around the country. That 
campaign culminated in my argument in INS v. St. Cyr4 where the 
Supreme Court rejected the broad claim of executive power, 
 
 2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 3. Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 4. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
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preserved the role of judicial review and denied the government’s 
attempt to deny immigrants recourse to independent judicial scrutiny. 
The Court found that an immigrant is constitutionally entitled to 
bring legal and constitutional challenges to a deportation order by the 
Great Writ of Habeas Corpus. The ruling vindicated a critical 
principle even while the Court avoided declaring IIRIRA’s 
restrictions unconstitutional. By employing the constitutional 
avoidance doctrine, the Court construed IRRIRA to preserve access 
to habeas corpus. That decision was issued just months before 9/11. It 
precipitated national headlines then, and its significance is even more 
striking now.  
Today, the debate over habeas corpus rages with respect to the 
rights of Guantanamo detainees and congressional repeal of habeas 
corpus in the Military Commission Act. That Act was, on the one 
hand, touted as a great accomplishment because it limited the 
government’s power to engage in torture, something that most of us 
thought was already prohibited. At the same time, it eliminates the 
right of detainees at Guantanamo to bring habeas corpus actions to 
challenge their detention. As the courts begin to consider the MCA, 
the government’s defense echoes its arguments for denying habeas 
corpus to immigrants. The government argues that habeas corpus 
does not encompass the claims that today’s “enemy combatant” 
detainees seek to bring, that there is another means by which the 
detainee can get to court, and that the alternative is adequate and 
effective. It remains to be seen how the courts will decide that 
question. For our purposes today, the critical observation is that this 
fundamental battle first arose in the immigration context and that the 
struggle over immigrants’ rights has repercussions beyond its own 
narrow confines.       
Let me then return to the question of comprehensive immigration 
reform legislation and connect it to the court-stripping issue. As I said 
at the outset, the legislation has some positive elements and its stated 
goal of providing a mechanism for legal status for countless 
undocumented immigrants in the United States commands the 
support of many policymakers across the spectrum. The concern with 
the current proposals that I want to emphasize is that embedded in the 
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Senate immigration bill are further restrictions on judicial review and 
further restrictions on access to the courts for immigrants.  
While I am encouraged that the sensitivity to judicial review and 
access to the courts is much greater now than it was a year ago—and 
certainly much greater than it was ten years ago when IIRIRA 
became law—the issues still appear too abstract to command 
sufficient attention and opposition. The experience with Guantanamo, 
the battle over the rights of those detainees, and the effort of 
Congress and the President to prohibit access to the courts, should 
create a much broader recognition of the historic importance of 
habeas corpus and its role in our constitutional system. I am often 
reminded of Zechariah Chaffee’s famous but sometimes forgotten 
law review article from 1953, “The Most Important Right in the 
Constitution.”5 He explains how every other individual right 
ultimately flows from the Great Writ because if the Executive can 
unilaterally throw you into prison without cause or process, then what 
does any other right mean? Thus, there is a growing recognition 
across many ideological divides that restricting habeas corpus for 
Guantanamo detainees violates such a fundamental principle that it 
threatens the civil liberties of all. I am struck that Richard Epstein 
just wrote a very compelling article in the Wall Street Journal on 
exactly why it is a huge mistake to repeal Habeas Corpus for 
Guantanamo detainees. So I am optimistic that both the legal 
community and broader public are much more attuned to proposals 
that might deprive individuals of access to the courts.  
Still, it is difficult to animate public concern over judicial review 
for immigrants. And the proposals to impose new limits on the 
courts’ authority over immigration decisions have become more 
nuanced and strategic. For example, in the immigration bill there is a 
provision enacting a so-called “certificate of reviewability.” That is a 
mechanism that would prohibit any appeals of immigration orders to 
any federal court unless it is first approved by a single judge whose 
decision is not reviewable. In other words, a single judge, whoever he 
or she might be, is the ultimate and final gatekeeper of each appeal. 
 
 5. Zechariah Chaffee, The Most Important Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U. L. REV. 143 
(1953). 
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One judge holds the singular power to determine whether or not an 
appeal can go forward.  
It is telling that the federal appellate judges who are actually 
grappling with a burgeoning docket of immigration appeals and for 
whose benefit the new restrictions are purportedly designed, oppose 
these measures. Judges from across the political spectrum, including 
Judge Posner on the 7th Circuit, Chief Judge Walker and Judge 
Newman on the 2d Circuit (who are Republican and Democratic 
appointees respectively), and judges appointed by Presidents of both 
parties on the 9th Circuit, have all expressed opposition to these new 
proposals. They all have said they don’t want to limit access of 
immigrants to judicial review. As Judge Newman recently testified 
before Senator Specter’s Committee, “We have never in the history 
of this country allowed one judge to cut off appeal on an issue of 
personal liberty in a case that has not been fully reviewed by a prior 
judicial system.”6  
As we stressed in St. Cyr and as Judge Newman’s criticism 
highlights, any restriction on review of deportation orders is 
especially troubling because an immigration appeal is not reviewing a 
previous judicial determination. It is not reviewing of a previous state 
court trial. It is not even like a death penalty case where the 
consequences are obviously as high as they could possibly be but 
where there has at least been a judicial process. In the immigration 
context, there has been nothing other than an Executive Branch 
process that is under the ultimate authority of the Attorney General.  
 
 6. Judicial Review of Immigration Matters: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109 
Cong. 11 (2006) (statement of Jon O. Newman, Senior Judge, U.S. Ct. App. 2d Cir.). The 
Judicial Conference of the United States submitted written opposition to both the certificate of 
reviewability provision and a proposal to centralize all immigration appeals in the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Senator Specter and the Committee received correspondence 
from numerous other appellate judges opposing one or both provisions. Among the Circuit 
Judges who submitted letters were Judges Richard A. Posner, John T. Noonan, Kim McLane 
Wardlaw, and Sidney R. Thomas as well as the Chief Judges of the Second and Ninth Circuits. 
John M. Walker and Mary M. Schroeder. Prominent scholars also expressed their opposition. 
See, e.g., Letter of Professors Rochelle C. Dreyfus, Harold Hongiu Koh, David A. Martin, 
Henry Paul Monaghan, Gerald L. Neuman, Judith Resnik, Richard L. Revesz, Philip G. Schrag, 
Peter H. Schuck, David L. Shapiro and Kathleen M. Sullivan. Numerous other letters from 
retired federal judges, law professors, and professional organizations also opposed one or both 
proposals. 
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Furthermore, the legislation also raises another crucial judicial 
review concern—one that relates directly to whether any legalization 
program will actually fulfill its promise. Namely, whether the 
government’s implementation of the program will be subject to 
judicial enforcement. Experience shows that what a legalization 
program might actually accomplish and who might actually benefit 
depends, first, on exactly what the criteria are. Then, and crucially, it 
depends on how those criteria are interpreted and how the program is 
actually administered and applied by the agency charged with its 
implementation. As the saying goes, the devil is in the details. 
Without judicial review, those details are left solely to the 
government and could torpedo the best-intended congressional plan.  
The last legalization law, enacted in 1986, provides a sobering 
lesson. The rules and regulations adopted by the immigration service 
under IRCA would have compromised the program dramatically. But 
because of a series of class action lawsuits filed in the federal 
courts—virtually all of which were successful in compelling change 
in the government’s interpretation of eligibility criteria—the program 
was forced to operate the way that Congress had intended. Those 
suits were possible because there was federal court jurisdiction over 
the claims, because judicial oversight was possible, in short, because 
eligible immigrants could bring litigation to require the agency to 
comply with the law. Today, because of restrictive court decisions, 
because of jurisdictional bars enacted in 1996, and because of 
prohibitions proposed in the new legislation, many of those suits 
would be difficult or impossible. Therefore, the danger I see is that 
while there is a huge debate over what the contours of a legalization 
program should be, the program itself might end up being a hollow 
promise if implementation is left solely to an agency that is 
overburdened, indifferent, or even hostile. If those implementation 
decisions are immune from effective and robust judicial review the 
program can be negated in practice. Meaningful review by the courts 
of both individual adjudications and systemic deficiencies is essential 
and must be the foundation of any legalization program.  
Judicial review, in short, is the fundamental foundation for 
protecting the rights of vulnerable non-citizens, for preserving 
fundamental checks against agency excess, for ensuring faithful 
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implementation of any legalization program that Congress might 
enact, and for compelling the Executive Branch to comply with the 
rule of law. That recognition is the missing component in today’s 
immigration debate.  
Before I close, I promised to mention at least briefly the lawsuit 
that we have brought on behalf of nine individuals against Secretary 
Rumsfeld for the torture and abuse of detainees in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The thrust of that suit is to try to impose constitutional 
limits on what the United States Government can do overseas to non-
citizens when it has people in its custody and control. There is a huge 
controversy over the extent to which the Constitution applies when 
the United States acts overseas against foreign nationals. There may 
be elements of the Constitution that do not apply everywhere in the 
world to governmental actions. But as Justice Harlan said long ago 
and as Justice Kennedy has echoed more recently, the fundamental 
rights protected by the Constitution should apply outside our territory 
when it is not impracticable or anomalous to do so.7 Justice Kennedy 
expressly invoked that principle in the case of a non-citizen who 
sought to enforce the Constitution in a foreign country.8 That 
principle compels, in my view, applying and enforcing core 
constitutional rights to protect persons who are subject to the power 
and the control of the United States and certainly to protect someone 
who is in a U.S. military detention facility. And it plainly should not 
be impracticable or anomalous to hold that the Constitution prohibits 
the torture of any person detained under the authority of the United 
States Government.  
* * * 
In conclusion, let me say again, we are facing many great 
challenges. The question is how will we respond; will we and our 
successors look back on this period ten, twenty, or fifty years from 
now with pride or with shame? Will we repeat the mistakes of the 
past or will we show that we have learned from them? Will the post-
9/11 period be akin to Japanese American interment or the McCarthy 
 
 7. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 65 (1957) (Harlan, J.M., concurring); United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990) (Kennedy, A., concurring). 
 8. Verdugo Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, A., concurring). 
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era where we engaged in practices we later renounce? Or, will we do 
better?  
My view is that it is too soon to reach definitive conclusions. But I 
am optimistic. We must demonstrate to ourselves and to the world 
that it is possible to have democratic institutions with respect for civil 
liberties and protection for civil rights while preserving national 
security and ensuring public safety. We must show that human rights 
and national security are not inconsistent, that civil liberties and 
national security are not incompatible. Given our strength, our 
diversity, and our democratic values, if the United States cannot do 
this, how can we expect it of other countries? And one absolutely 
essential principle that is central to this endeavor is the 
preservation—not just in theory but in practice—of judicial review. 
The checks and balances that we learn about in grade school and all 
through our education are needed more than ever. It is essential to 
have an independent judiciary with courageous judges who are 
willing to fulfill the historic role of the Judiciary.  
Finally, the last thing I would say to all of you, especially given 
that this talk is part of a public interest lecture series, is that the courts 
cannot function without lawyers. Courts do not sit there by 
themselves. As law students, you will all be practicing law very 
soon—much sooner than you think, I know it may not seem like that 
now, but the start of your career is just around the corner. You will be 
practicing law and you will have choices and opportunities and the 
chance to make important contributions to our profession and 
country. I do not want to diminish the crushing debt that our 
education system imposes on so many of you, or the family 
obligations you may have, or the many different interests that each of 
you may pursue. But I would say that whatever you do with your 
legal career, remember that the role of the law is to give a voice to the 
powerless, to protect the rights and ensure equal treatment of those 
who need those protections the most.  
The least powerful in society are the most dependent on the rule 
of law. Those who lack economic and political power are the ones for 
whom the courts are the most important and who depend most on the 
law for a measure of justice. So, as you launch your legal career, 
remember to contribute some part of your career to the fight for equal 
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justice; to make this a better and more just society for those who need 
it the most. Be involved, be a participant, and be a citizen in the true 
and grandest sense of that word. Namely, be someone who helps us 
all collectively as a nation live up to our promise that continues to 
serve as a beacon of hope and opportunity for the world. This is the 
time to engage in that challenge.  
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